Lounge
May 7, 2015
Chapter 9: The Pitfalls of Thinking Based on the 'Principle of Averages'
Chapter 9: The Pitfalls of "Average Principle" Thinking
By Shizuyuki Ima
—A Direct Path to Major Failure Through Half-Knowledge—
—In Any Era, Motivation and Drive Are Key—
There is a story from the Meiji era.
There was a young mathematician studying mathematics. One day, he had to cross a river in a small boat and was reminded of the mathematical "average principle." He asked the boatman to measure the depth of both banks and the deepest part of the river, calculated the average depth, and concluded that it was shallow enough to walk across, given his height. To save the return fare, he attempted to walk across the river and disappeared into the water.
This is an allegorical tale of a major failure brought about by half-knowledge, a cautionary story that strongly warns against superficial cleverness.
Let's consider another familiar example. Suppose there are 100 people here now. Ninety-nine are poor with zero savings, but if just one person has 100 million yen in savings, the average savings per person among the 100 would be 1 million yen. Launching a business based on this figure would undoubtedly lead to a major failure.
The intention behind presenting these instructive examples is to ensure that people understand well how postwar Japan achieved remarkable growth by "denying and overturning the average principle."
There is a very influential academic theory in economics called the "law of comparative advantage." This was first explained by the British economist David Ricardo (1772-1823) using the concept of comparative advantage.
When multiple countries trade, if the products (goods) or services produced by country A are relatively cheaper compared to the products and services of country B, then country A is said to have a comparative advantage in those goods and services. This theory posits that it is beneficial for each country to engage in international trade by specializing (in technical terms, "specialization") in the production, provision, and sale of goods and services in which it has a comparative advantage.
Taking the United States as an example, many industries, such as textiles, steel, and automobiles, are gradually losing their comparative advantage due to factors like wage costs. It is desirable for these industries, which are losing their comparative advantage, to reduce production and leave it to countries that have a comparative advantage elsewhere. By doing so, it is best to redirect the freed-up labor and resources to other industries.
This is a sound theory from any perspective, and one cannot help but agree with it. Each country should concentrate on its industries with a comparative advantage. In this case, theory and reality align perfectly.
So, what was the situation with the Japanese economy after the war? Japan had no significant resources to speak of, and over 100 million people had to live crammed together in a small country. Furthermore, due to World War II, technological exchange with other countries had ceased, leaving Japan far behind the Western nations.
According to the "law of comparative advantage," postwar Japan would have had no choice but to specialize in labor-intensive industries such as textiles and general merchandise. Starting industries like automobiles and steel would have been a deviation from the "theory of comparative advantage" and considered an act of madness.
In fact, when Kawasaki Steel announced its grand plan in 1951 to establish an integrated steelworks in Chiba Prefecture, the then Governor of the Bank of Japan, Hisato Ichimada, declared with conviction, "America has superior technology and abundant, cheap iron ore and coal. From an economic rationality standpoint, Japan should not pursue this. Failure is certain," adding, "Only weeds will grow there."
Similar views were expressed by influential members of parliament regarding passenger car production. They argued that passenger car production should be halted, as Japan's factory equipment and production methods were incomparable to those of overseas countries. Instead, they strongly advocated that exporting textile products and using the earned money to import passenger cars would align with national policy and be more rational.
The results need no further explanation.
Japan's steel production surpassed that of the United States, becoming the world's number one along with the then Soviet Union, and passenger car production also overtook that of the United States to become the world's largest producer.
Both industries became the driving force of the Japanese economy through exports. Before the war, Japan rallied under the banner of "Enrich the Country, Strengthen the Military" and, at all costs, built up achievements and strength to rival the Western powers.
After the war, the "Strengthen the Military" aspect disappeared, but in its place, Japan worked relentlessly with a singular focus on "Enrich the Country" to catch up with and surpass the Western developed nations. Enriching the country meant economic power itself.
This determination swept aside the plausible, or rather, commonplace logic of economic theories like comparative advantage. In a word, it can be said that this was the result of the Japanese people's "drive" and the unified effort of the government, industry, and labor, all aiming to become a heavy industrial nation.
I hope that people will move forward with a resolve to do things differently, not just follow the plausible or ordinary policies based on past trends, but with a determination to avoid doing what everyone else is doing.